Photo: MF3d/E+/Getty Images

Photo: MF3d/E+/Getty Images

When we discuss the security of GNSS/PNT systems, we nearly always focus on interference — i.e., meaconing, intrusion, jamming or spoofing. However, GNSS/PNT systems are embedded in systems of systems that also offer many other opportunities for cyberattacks.

What should we do about it?

Ellen Hall

“The key is platform architecture, specifically ensuring robust spatial and temporal partitioning between safety-critical and non-safety-critical functions. Safety-critical functions, such as navigation and autopilot, must be isolated from non-safety-critical functions, such as mission compute, where artificial intelligence typically operates. This partitioning minimizes the scope and effort required to produce design assurance artifacts for airworthiness certification. Additionally, it enhances security by reducing potential attack vectors through the isolation of safety-critical and mission-critical capabilities.”

— Ellen Hall
Imminent Federal

Mitch Narins

“An old mariner’s proverb is: ‘The prudent mariner never relies solely on any single aid to navigation.’ A more recent statement offers: ‘With so many pieces of sophisticated electronic equipment at our beck and call it would seem some are lulled into complacency and are ignoring basic seamanship.’ In September 2018, the U.S. Naval Institute published an article titled, ‘Professional Mariners Cannot Rely on Electronics Alone.’ The recent news that the U.S. ITAR restrictions on multi-element antenna arrays will be lifted (thanks to many in our community who have lobbied hard for this for many, many years) is excellent news. It will help and was a necessary change — but it is not sufficient. It certainly does not remove the need to pursue complementary, PNT solutions that will ensure the safety, security, and economic well-being of PNT users and their PNT-dependent systems worldwide. From a basic systems engineering perspective, incorporating multiple solutions with independent failure mechanisms is ultimately the end product that we in the PNT community should all be seeking. We must not forget, however, a key element of many of these systems: the human in the loop, who, if continually provided the opportunity to train in PNT-challenged environments, often can be the ultimate system safety element. This will require the design of our PNT services to ensure that the human factors designed into these systems include sufficient information for the human component to understand an off-normal situation and have the training and skills to take the appropriate corrective actions.”

— Mitch Narins
Strategic Synergies