On March 27, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) unanimously approved a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) to explore GPS alternatives, amid escalating threats to security and system resiliency. The move signals growing federal concern about the reliability of space-based navigation and timing infrastructure amid rising global interference and spoofing incidents.

But while the FCC’s broad consideration of alternative technologies is a welcome step forward, its framing also risks weakening one of GPS’s most important defenses: the growing adoption of multi-constellation strategies across the commercial sector.

Rising Threats, Broader Mandates

The FCC’s decision follows the release of the International Air Transport Association’s (IATA) latest safety report, which documented a 175% increase in GPS interference and a 500% rise in spoofing attacks year-over-year. These incidents pose critical challenges to aviation safety, emergency services, telecommunications, and countless other sectors that rely on Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) services.

Against this backdrop, the Commission’s vote reflects a bipartisan sense of urgency. The NOI invites public comment on a range of technologies that could serve as complements or alternatives to GPS, including low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, terrestrial signals, and enhanced end-user devices. This broad framing is encouraging and acknowledges the multifaceted nature of PNT resilience.

A Multi-Layered Approach to PNT

The FCC’s focus on diversification — across space-based, terrestrial, and user-level technologies — is not only prudent, but essential. Enhancing national security and system redundancy requires more than a single backup solution. It demands layered resiliency that integrates complementary modalities into a cohesive ecosystem.

It is very encouraging that the NOI outlines a wide array of candidate technologies that could play a role in improving the U.S. PNT infrastructure. These range from inertial navigation systems and time transfer services to novel terrestrial radio signals and commercial LEO constellations. By casting a wide net, the FCC opens the door to innovation and allows market forces to contribute meaningfully to PNT modernization.

Commercial Reality vs. Government Narrative

However, the FCC’s discussion notably underplays a key reality: few commercial technologies today rely solely on GPS. The commercial PNT landscape has already moved beyond single-source dependency, with the vast majority of systems integrating multiple GNSS constellations (such as GPS, Galileo, BeiDou and GLONASS) alongside additional sensor and signal data to ensure robust coverage and accuracy.

This multi-constellation approach is arguably the single most powerful tool we have to strengthen the resilience of GPS-dependent systems. By allowing receivers to pull data from multiple GNSS sources, users gain spatial and signal diversity, enabling them to cross-check signals, reject spoofed or erroneous data, and maintain accurate position and timing even in degraded environments. It’s important to remember that a device can’t selectively use GNSS networks depending on the user’s geography. If U.S. device makers disable BeiDou and GLONASS, then anywhere in the world that receiver goes it will be less performant and competitive. In recent field tests, we found that disabling the BeiDou constellation decreased a device’s positioning accuracy by 30% to 40%.

This accuracy and resilience are especially important in sectors like aviation, autonomous systems, and emergency response, where signal fidelity and redundancy can be life-saving. Multi-constellation GNSS use isn’t theoretical: it’s already the industry standard.

The International Tightrope

Despite this, key elements of the NOI, as well as comments during the meeting, reflect a growing U.S. government skepticism toward the inclusion of foreign GNSS systems, especially BeiDou and GLONASS. While geopolitical caution is understandable, overly rigid restrictions on international signals could do more harm than good.

These systems are not merely foreign-owned alternatives. They are integral components of the modern GNSS environment. Many U.S. commercial devices — ranging from smartphones to augmented reality, fleet tracking systems, drones, and more — already leverage multiple GNSS sources by default. Future technologies such as autonomous vehicles, robotics and urban air mobility will also require multiple GNSS signals to function. Prohibiting or restricting their use could mean rolling back years of progress in signal resilience, not to mention stymying future technologies, and all for a speculative and largely unquantified national security risk.

While there are some valid concerns about adversarial control over PNT infrastructure, the FCC must weigh these carefully against the real,…